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Since its secession from Somalia in 1991, the east-African nation of Somaliland has become one of the most 
democratic governments in eastern Africa. Yet Somaliland has never been recognized by the international 
community. This paper examines how this lack of recognition—and the consequent ineligibility for foreign 
financial  assistance—has  shaped  Somaliland’s  political  development.  It  finds  evidence  that  Somaliland’s 
ineligibility for foreign aid facilitated the development of accountable political institutions and contributed to 
the willingness of Somalilanders to engage constructively in the state-building process.
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I am delighted to sponsor this working paper by Nicholas Eubank, an upcoming doctoral student 
at the Stanford Graduate School of Business, on how the absence of international recognition and 
lack of direct access to official development assistance has positively affected state-building in 
Somaliland. The paper is commissioned as part of CGD’s ongoing work on weak and fragile 
states, which is focused on improving the effectiveness of aid in post-conflict interventions. 
Eubank’s paper contributes to this initiative by focusing on the potential hazards of large 
volumes of development assistance, including its effects on political accountability, institution 
building, and social-contract bargaining. Eubank examines how, in the absence of other sources 
of revenue, the New Charter government of Somaliland  had incentives to establish credible 
political institutions and engage with the business community to create a tax-based relationship 
with its citizens to fill its coffers. The Somaliland government’s inability to rely on foreign aid 
forced it to explore endogenous sources of revenue, inducing legitimate state-building as 
officials needed to be accountable to the general public, including the local business community. 
 
Developed-country governments, as well as bilateral and multilateral institutions, have directed 
significant resources toward state-building and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries to 
induce security and establish political stability. Assistance in fragile and post-conflict countries 
is likely to grow as developed states increasingly consider such aid to be a key part of their 
national security strategies.  But while donor money can help restore social services in a country, 
it may engender predation and decrease the government’s need to foster relationships with its 
constituents.  Somaliland has unique characteristics that may have contributed to this positive 
development outcome (such as a lack of abundant natural resources and a parity of clan 
representation in government), but it is a valuable case-study for policymakers. The experience 
suggests taking a tempered approach to aid interventions and raises interesting questions about 
geopolitical boundaries of what the international community considers a fragile state or a fragile 
situation. Political accountability and corruption are key worries in international treatment of 
post-conflict and failed states, and finding ways to mitigate a slide back into fragility is a must.  
Overall, this paper is an interesting look at a politically successful region of an otherwise 
anarchic state. Eubank is an exciting new voice in the debate on appropriate foreign assistance 
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One of the largest puzzles to emerge from the recent literature on foreign aid effectiveness is the 
discrepancy between the findings of micro-level studies of individual aid projects and macro-
level studies of aggregate development indicators. When studies examine individual aid projects, 
the results are usually quite positive. Along project-specific criteria, aid interventions appear 
effective. At a national level, however, evidence of the impact of aid becomes elusive. This 
discrepancy suggests that foreign aid may have a negative “second order” effect on recipient 
countries beyond the impact of the actual projects it finances. These second order effects would 




Some explanations that have emerged for this irregularity focus on economic mechanisms. For 
instance,  some  have  suggested  that  foreign  assistance  causes  exchange  rate  overvaluation, 
reducing  international  competitiveness.
2  Yet  a  growing  number  of  statistical  and  qualitative 
studies suggest these second order effects may be political. Recent econometric studies show 
high aid intensity (large amounts of foreign aid as a share of the overall size of an economy) to 
be associated with declining quality of governance (Brautigam and Knack (2004)) and declining 
indicators of democracy (Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2005)).  
 
Yet  despite  increased  attention  to  this  issue,  this  literature  continues  to  struggle  with 
methodological  issues.  Because  the  international  community  has  been  continually  and 
significantly involved in nearly all sub-Saharan African states since independence, there is no 
way to compare aid receiving states to non-aid receiving states, either cross-sectionally or inter-
temporally. And where variation in aid levels within or between countries exist, it is difficult to 
tell  whether  this  variation  is  causing  changes  in  recipient  countries,  or  whether  donors  are 
responding  to  changes  in  recipient  countries.  The  econometric  studies  cited  above  have 
attempted to adjust for this endogeneity of foreign assistance using instrumental variables, but 
these strategies have not achieved widespread acceptance.  
 
The  East-African  nation  of  Somaliland  provides  a  unique  opportunity  to  move  beyond  this 
limitations.  Somaliland  was  formed  when  it  seceded  from  Somalia  in  1991,  and  due  to 
exogenous international norms against secession, it was not deemed eligible for international aid. 
Consequently, political actors within Somaliland have never received development assistance. 
                                                 
1 Evidence of the discrepancies between project-level studies of aid effectiveness and studies of the impact of aid on 
macro-level development indicators first emerged in the mid-1990s when Peter Boone published “Politics and the 
Effectiveness of Foreign Aid” (Boone, 1996). In contrast to literature that came before it, Boone‟s paper focused on 
cross-country regressions using large panel data in an effort to capture the large-scale effects of aid that might have 
been overlooked by earlier micro-level analyses. This work launched what has come to be known as the “Third 
Generation” of aid effectiveness literature. This paper was later followed by the infamous Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) paper which found that aid had a beneficial effect in countries with a good policy environment before being 
refuted by Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004). Since then, robust evidence of aid effectiveness remains elusive. 
For every study that connects aid to growth (such as Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004)), another finds no 
evidence  of  any  effect  (Rajan  and  Subramanian  (2005a)).  Clemens,  Radelet,  and  Bhavnani  (2004)  provide  an 
excellent overview of the evolution of this literature. 
2 Rajan and Subramanian (2005b).  
2 
This makes Somaliland an ideal environment to examine how a lack of external financial support 
shapes the development of endogenous political institutions. 
 
Yet  despite  occasional  commentary  on  this  subject  and  anecdotal  evidence  of  Somaliland 
benefiting from its lack of aid, to date no systematic study has been conducted on how a lack of 
foreign financial resources influenced the development of Somaliland‟s political institutions.  
 
This paper finds that the lack of external financial assistance to Somaliland shaped political 
incentives in three distinct ways. First, a lack of outside financial support increased the influence 
of  the  business  community,  which  provided  all  government  financing.  Because  pastoral 
economies are dependent upon stability and management of public goods like water and grazing 
lands,  the  influence  of  the  business  community  has  proved  to  be  supportive  of  political 
reconciliation.  
 
Second, with a large number of political actors with relative parity in terms of resources, a lack 
of outside support has forced compromise and co-option of opposition groups. Many times in 
Somaliland‟s  history,  small  groups  have  tried  to  form  a  government  and  found  themselves 
incapable of maintaining it – forcing the groups to expand their coalition at the cost of their own 
influence.  
 
Third  and  most  importantly,  Somaliland‟s  ineligibility  for  foreign  assistance  helped  allay 
concerns among the general population of Somaliland about the emergence of a predatory state 
in Somaliland, facilitating the formation of a national government. With no foreign assistance, 
the Somaliland government did not have an independent revenue base, making it dependent upon 




These findings and the evidence that supports them is highly suggestive, but they have certain 
limitations.  Limited  international  engagement  with  Somaliland  during  its  early  political 
development means that detailed accounts of political deliberations are lacking. As a result, this 
analysis is more dependent upon circumstantial inference than would otherwise be preferable.  
This  fact  is  compounded by the fact  that this study is  based on a literature review and not 
personal field work or interviews. Moreover, in attempting to identify the impact of Somaliland‟s 
ineligibility for foreign aid, this analysis is limited by the fact the the counter-factual -- how 
Somaliland would have developed had it been eligible -- can never be known.  
 
Despite these limitations, Somaliland nevertheless offers one of the only contexts in which to 
observe the modern evolution of political systems in the absence of foreign aid in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and imperfect though circumstances may be, there is still value in the study, if imperfect, 




The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 will provide a brief historical 
summary of Somaliland‟s political evolution to provide context for later analysis; Section 2 will  
3 
examine the influence of the business sector on Somaliland‟s political development; Section 3 
will examine how financial constraints affected the development of national political institutions; 
Section 4 will examine how Somaliland‟s ineligibility for financial assistance helped allay public 
concerns about the rise of a predatory state and facilitated political consolidation; and Section 5 
will explore implications of this analysis for Somaliland and development policy in general.   
4 
 
SECTION 1: Brief History of Somaliland 
 
Somaliland owes its modern day origins to the Somali civil war against the regime of Siad Barre, 
which began in the early 1980s. Since coming to power in 1969, the regime of Siad Barre had 
grown increasingly oppressive, particularly to the northern regions of Somalia.
3 So in 1981, a 
group of exiles from the Isaaq clan, the most populous clan in northern Somalia, formed the 
Somali National Moment (SNM) to challenge the regime.
4 
 
The long war against Siad Barre‟s government came at a high cost to the northern regions of 
Somalia. When the SNM took control of the major cities of Burco and Hargeysa (the future 
capital of Somaliland) in 1988, the response by the Barre regime was swift. “[A]rtillery and 
aircraft  bombed  the  major  towns  into  rubble  and  forced  the  displacement  of  roughly  half  a 
million refugees across the border into Ethiopia. Isaaq dwellings were systematically destroyed, 
while their settlements and water points were extensively mined.”
5 
 
The war was eventually won with the disposition of the Barre regime in 1991. The victory threw 
southern Somalia into chaos. No single group in the region was able to secure control of the 
government, and conflict broke out among local militias and warlords. But while the conflict in 
southern Somalia is now well known, the northern regions of the country have received less 
international attention.  
 
When the Barre regime collapsed in 1991, the SNM was left as the clear dominant political and 
military organization in the northern region.
6 In May it called for a conference in the town of 
Burco  to  discuss  the  fate  of  the  northern  region.  Elders  from  nearly  every  major  clan  in 
Somaliland gathered with the leadership of the SNM to decide on a plan of action.
7 
 
First among the SNM‟s challenges was re-building a region destroyed by a long fight against 
Barre‟s forces. According to a War-Torn Societies report released in 2005, 
 
In Hargeysa [the future capital of Somaliland], a town of nearly 300,000 people, 
barely 10% of the structures remained intact, leaving only a vast field of blasted 
rubble strewn with explosives. [...] Burco, to the east, had suffered roughly 70% 
destruction, and countless villages in the interior had been razed to the ground. 
Hospitals, schools, clinics and wells had all been destroyed, government offices 
ransacked, bridges blown up, and roads mined and made impassable.
8 
 
Facing  this  tremendous  rebuilding  effort,  some  tribal  elders  and  SNM  leadership  wished  to 
consider a union with southern Somalia in a federated government, in part out of concern they 
would not be able to secure international support if they seceded.
9 
 
                                                 
3 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (1999), p. 16-17. 
4 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 6.  
5 International Crisis Group (2003). p. 6 
6 Bradbury (2008), p. 79 and 83. 
7 Bradbury (2008), p. 79.  
8 War-Torn Societies Project (2005), p. 24. 
9 Bradbury (2008), p. 81.  
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At the time of these debates, the international community was becoming increasingly concerned 
about the sanctity of the nation state. The US was engaging in a war with Iraq premised on the 
sanctity of internationally recognized borders, and events in the Balkans were leaving the world 
increasingly  concerned  about  the  destabilizing  effect  that  the  secession  of  minority  groups 
throughout the world might bring. And nowhere was this concern more clear than in Africa, 
where  hastily  drawn  colonial  borders  seemed  to  hold  together  states  only  due  to  intense 
international assertion of their importance. 
 
But the public, fearing a return to oppression by a Mogadishu based government poured into the 
streets after hearing about the plan on the radio, changing “No more Mogadishu!”
10 And so in 
response to this pressure, Somaliland‟s independence was declared on May 18, 1991.
11 
 
In the hopes it would increase the chances of getting international support, the SNM decided to 
announce that it was not seceding, but returning to autonomy the region of Somalia that had been 
ruled by the British during colonial period. This region had been granted statehood for a period 
of four days during decolonization before agreeing to merge with southern Somalia in 1960. The 
SNM argued that they were not seceding, but rather nullifying the Act of Union that merged the 
two  countries  in  1960.
12  The  international  community  was  strongly  invested  in  recreating  a 
unified Somalia, however, and these arguments were ignored.
13 
 
As the only large-scale political organization in the now independent state of Somaliland, the 
SNM created a transitional government built around its leadership council that was to govern 
from  1991  to  1993.  Representatives  from  across  the  state  agreed  to  this  arrangement,  and 
Somaliland‟s first government was born.  
 
From that point forward, Somaliland‟s political development followed two parallel and at times 
intersecting tracks. On one was the evolution of national political institutions, on the other was 
the  development  of  local  polities  that  would  later  prove  to  be  the  building  blocks  of  the 
Somaliland state.  
 
From 1991 to  1997, Somaliland struggled to  develop  a national  government, but  repeatedly 
found that established institutions did not have broad enough support to be viable. Through a 
series of national conferences that will be explored in more detail later, political institutions 
eventually developed with sufficient support to govern, and in 2001 Somaliland ratified a new 
constitution with broad public support. 
 
The institutions that evolved during this period survive to this day. Since 1997, Somaliland has  
had presidential, parliamentary, and district level elections.
14 It has seen a peaceful handoff of 
the presidency to a minority clan president,
15 and a presidential election which was decided by an 
                                                 
10 Bradbury (2008), p. 81-82. 
11 Bradbury (2008), p. 81-82. 
12 Bradbury (2008), p. 82-83. 
13 Bradbury (2008), p. 85. 
14 Bradbury (2008), p. 184-219. 
15 Bradbury (2008), p. 135-136.  
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80 vote margin without resort to violence.
16 Creating a national voter registry is proving to be a 
significant political and logistic problem at the moment,
17 and Somaliland continues to struggle 
with the provision of public goods because of its weak tax base and lack of international support 
-- but Somaliland provides security and stability, which is more than many other internationally 
recognized states can claim.  
  
Despite these successes, Somaliland‟s efforts to shake its secessionist label and gain international 
recognition have failed. As a result, the Somaliland government does not, and never has received 
international  financial  assistance,  relying  instead  on  a  locally  mobilized  budget  which  has 
oscillated between $20 and 40 million USD between 1999 and 2007.
18 This is not to say that it 
does not receive any aid, only that the small amount of aid it receives is directly administered by 
local  NGOs  and  aid  agencies.  None  of  the  aid  Somaliland  receives  is  administered  by  the 
government or appears in the government budget.
19 
 
Accurate statistics  on aid allocations  to Somaliland are difficult  to  come by  as  international 
donors do not report the share of aid going to the unrecognized country, but the gross figure 
appeared to be between $30-$43 million USD in 2002.
20 However, “this figure does not show the 
high proportion  of donor funding that is  spent  on overhead, Nairobi  offices  or international 
personnel. Probably less than half of the total volume of aid is actually spent on the ground.”
21  
More recently, in 2009 Human Rights Watch reported that Somaliland‟s government estimates 
that the region receives approximately $79 million USD per year.
22 To put these numbers in 
context, Somaliland‟s population is estimated at 2-3.5 million people, earns around $180 million 
USD  a  year  in  export  earnings,  and  receives  an  estimated  $200  million  USD  a  year  in 
remittances according to that same report. 
 
Even  without  international  support,  Somaliland‟s  economy,  which  is  built  primarily  around 
pastoral farming and animal husbandry, has largely recovered from the devastation of years of 
conflict.
23 Somaliland has rebuilt many of the cities destroyed during Somalia‟s civil war, and 
economic activity in much of the country is thriving. As Bradbury (2008), has noted: 
 
Over  the  past  fifteen  years,  the  cities,  small  towns,  and  villages  have  been 
substantially rebuilt and expanded. Commercial activity is vibrant. Utilities have 
been restored, telephone systems have been established linking Somaliland into 
the world-wide web, where numerous Somaliland websites can now be accessed, 
and  Somali  companies  have  established  services  throughout  the  country  that 
                                                 
16 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 23-25. Nearly half a million ballots were cast.  
17 A detailed summary of Somaliland‟s current struggles with these issues can be found in International Crisis 
Group (2009).  
18 Bradbury (2008), p. 236-237 provides data up through 2003, while Somaliland Ministry of Planning and 
Coordination (2008) provides more up to date data. 
19 War-Torn Societies Project (2005). p. 100.; Ministry of Planning and Coordination (2008), p. 13.  
20 Bradbury (2008), p. 157. provides the estimate of $43 million, while International Crisis Group (2003), p. 6-7. 
provides an estimate of $30 million.  
21 International Crisis Group (2003), p. 6-7. 
22 Human Rights Watch (2009), p. 55. 
23 Bradbury (2008), p. 138-139.  
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Statistical data on Somaliland is exceedingly scarce, making objective confirmation of these 
accounts difficult,
25 but what data does exist suggests significant improvements in the region 
since  Somalia‟s  civil  war.  Government  data  on  school  enrollment,  for  example  --  the  only 
available data on Somaliland collected as far back as the 1990s -- shows significant improvement 
in the region. Somaliland has established six new universities since 1995, when the region had 
none,
26 and primary and secondary school enrollment has improved for both boys and girls as 
shown in Figure 1.
27 These numbers mask the same urban biases found in many developing 
countries and the fact that schools remain prohibitively expensive for many poor families,
28 but 
the improvement in availability over such a short period is itself remarkable. 
 
Figure 1 
    
 
Available  data  also  strongly  suggests  Somaliland  is  doing  significantly  better  than  southern 
Somalia, a significant reversal of the pre-civil war income distribution in the region. A 2002 
UNDP/World Bank household survey finds that the regions of Somaliland have significantly 
higher incomes than regions of southern Somalia.
29 A very crude extrapolation of the survey‟s 
results  suggests an average income of $300 USD per capita in  Somaliland, compared to  an 
average  income  of  $225  USD  when  all  of  southern  Somalia  and  Somaliland  are  examined 
together. (Estimates for “Somalia” presented by the UNDP and World Bank continue to include 
                                                 
24 Bradbury (2008), p. 137. 
25 The limited availability of data on Somaliland comes from two sources. The first the lack of surveys conducted in 
Somalia during the 1990s. The 2003 UNDP/World Bank cited above constituted the first multi-sectoral nationwide 
household survey conducted in greater Somalia (southern Somalia and Somaliland) in two decades. The second 
source of limited data comes from the continued treatment of southern Somalia and Somaliland as a single country 
by the international community even when collecting statistical information. Some reports, like those cited above, 
break down data by colonial regions, but there are imperfect categories at best.  
26 Somaliland Ministry of Planning and Coordination (2004), p. 58 and Somaliland Ministry of Planning and 
Coordination (2008), p. 54. 
27 Beyond this school data, the Somaliland government does not provide any statistics over extended time periods 
which might be useful as measures of economic activity or social service provision aside from government 
expenditure data (which is explored in more detail later). 
28 Bradbury (2008), p. 165. 
29 UNDP/World Bank (2003), p. 23.   
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Somaliland as a part of Somalia).
30 The few health statistics that are available specifically for 
Somaliland  also  suggest  that  the  country  is  doing  better  than  the  rest  of  Somalia,  although 
Somaliland‟s indicators still leave much to be desired. For example, the infant mortality rate in 
Somaliland was half the average of all of Somalia and Somaliland in 2000 (113 versus 224 
deaths  per  1,000  live  births).
31  To  some  degree  this  comparison  to  southern  Somalia  sets  a 
relatively  low  bar,  but  in  a  region  of  failed  states,  brutally  repressive  regimes,  and  brazen 
electoral  fraud,  Somaliland‟s  accomplishments  are,  in  the  words  of  a  recent  Human  Rights 
Watch report, “both improbable and deeply impressive.”
32 
                                                 
30 UNDP/World Bank (2003), p. 23. Estimate derived by simple average of the five regions the make up Somaliland, 
as population data by region is not available for calculating weighted averages. Estimates for these regions are 
relatively tightly clustered between approximately $275-$350 per capita, however, making an estimate of $300 a 
reasonable approximation.  There is no way to account for the fact that only parts of Sool and Sanaag are a part of 
Somaliland, however.  
31 Bradbury (2008), p. 162. A good survey of all available statistics on Somaliland can be found in Bradbury (2008) 
from pages 160-183. 




POLITICAL ROLE OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY 
 
One of the main concerns voiced in literature on the possible negative effects of foreign aid is 
that  foreign  assistance  may  decrease  government  dependence  on  tax  revenues.  This  may  be 
detrimental for two reasons: one, it may decrease the incentive of the government to promote 
positive economic development, as its revenue base is less tied to overall economic activity; and 
two, it removes an important mechanism by which citizens can demand accountability from the 
government. Because citizens and businesses can resist taxation, and by doing so increase the 
costs of tax collection, decreasing its efficacy, dependency on tax revenue creates a de facto 
mechanism of accountability which can be employed even in the absence of effective de jure 
accountability arrangements. Resisting taxation deprives the government of revenue, weakening 




With this in mind, one of the most remarkable impacts of Somaliland‟s international isolation is 
the  degree  to  which  that  isolation  increased  the  political  influence  of  the  local  business 
community. In the absence of international financial support and of developed natural resources, 
both local polities and Somaliland‟s national government relied on local business communities 
for financial support, either in the form of direct loans to the government or commercial taxation. 
This  dependency  has  endowed  the  commercial  sector  in  Somaliland  with  a  great  deal  of 
influence vis-a-vis the government -- influence which appears to have had a beneficial effect on 
Somaliland‟s political development.  
 
This influence has been well noted among observers of Somaliland. Bradbury has called the 
relationship  between  the  business  community  and  the  government  in  the  mid-1990‟s  a 
“relationship of co-dependency.”
34 De Waal goes as far as to characterize the government of 
Somaliland  as  a  “profit-sharing  agreement  among  the  dominant  livestock  traders,  with  a 




It is not difficult to see why the influence of the business community has been characterized in 
this way. Not only has the private sector has provided nearly all financing for the series of local 
polities  that  developed  throughout  Somaliland  before  the  establishment  of  a  truly  national 
government, they also provided nearly all financing for the numerous (by one count at least 32)
36  
national, regional, and local peace conferences that were held across Somaliland between 1991 
and  1997.
37  These  conferences  consisted  both  of  local  conferences  that  helped  settle  local 
disputes and lay the groundwork for larger, national conferences, and the national conferences 
themselves. 
                                                 
33 Both Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006) and Moore (2008) provide exceptional and more extensive 
overviews of existing literature on this subject. 
34 Bradbury (2008), p. 155. 
35 De Waal (2007). p. 13 of 19.  
36 War-Torn Societies Project (2005). p. 64 
37 Bradbury (2008), p. 98. One notable exception is the series of national reconciliation conferences held in 1997, 
which was mostly financed by the government itself (Bradbury, (2008), p. 125.).  
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This  influence  manifested  in  variety  of  ways,  some  readily  visible,  some  less  so.  When  a 
transitional government was created in Boorame in 1993, the business community loaned the 
government $6-7 million USD, a critical source of funds at the time. Even after this initial loan 
was repaid in 2000, the private sector has continued to provide the government with loans.
38 
 
The business  community  also  played an  active role in  demobilizing by  providing  rations  to 
demobilized militia members
39 and to a new government army and police force.
40 And when 
Somaliland‟s fragile peace was upset by fighting over Somaliland‟s main port, businessmen who 
relied on the port for export of livestock were an active voice for peace. Both De Waal
41 and 
Bradbury make this point, with Bradbury pointing out that: 
 
Concerned with the commercial consequences of the fighting in Berbera in 1992, 
[Isaaq businessmen, the wealthiest of whom were based in Djibouti] subsequently 
played  an  important  role  in  restoring  stability  by  funding  peace  conferences, 
providing  resources  for  demobilization  and  the  new  security  services,  and 
underwriting the state by providing loans to the administration.
42 
 
Other impacts are more subtle. As already noted, Somaliland‟s national government was built 
upon the foundation of agreements made by local polities, which were also supported by local 
commercial groups. Bradbury (2008) notes that the agreements made by these local polities were 
exceptional for the degree to which they focused on what he refers to as “civil issues,” like 
freedom of movement, water and grazing rights, and private property definitions, all critical to a 
pastoral economy. There was a “synergy between the Somaliland-wide peace conferences and 
the  local  peacemaking  processes,  which  succeeded  in  containing  violence  while  crafting  a 




Commercial interest played a large role in motivating local polities to address civil issues. As a 
result of the pastoral nature of the region‟s economy, cooperation and stability are viewed among 
Somalilanders as prerequisites for economic prosperity. This view is embodied “by the Somali 
saying  nabad  iyo  caano  (`peace  and  milk‟  or  `peace  and  prosperity‟),  which  [...]  stands  in 
opposition to the phrase ol iyo abaar (`conflict and drought‟).”
44 Bradbury (2008) makes this 
point quite eloquently:  
 
Access to pasture and water is assured through peaceful cooperation. Access to 
land and its usage was an underlying issue in the civil war in Sanaag and a driving 
force behind peace there. In order for people to survive and resume their way of 
life there was a need to re-establish cooperative relations over pastoral resources 
and trade. The series of peace meetings that were concluded prior to the Erigavo 
                                                 
38 Bradbury (2008), p. 155.  
39 Bulhan (2004), p. 101.  
40 Bradbury (2008), p. 112. 
41 De Waal (2007), p. 13 of 19.  
42 Bradbury (2008), p. 94. 
43 Bradbury (2008), p. 107.  
44 Bradbury (2008), p. 103.  
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conference  set  out  the  parameters  for  peaceful  cooperation:  freedom  of 
movement; freedom of trade; access to common grazing areas; access to common 
water sources; and the return of private property.”
45 
 
More recently, the private sector has also emerged as a key player in the provision of public 
goods in Somaliland. Because of tight budget constraints, only 10% of the national government 
of Somaliland‟s limited budget is allocated for social spending,
46 but public-private partnerships 
have helped to fill the void left by the government‟s limited capacity. These partnerships include 
things like: 
 
management  of  municipal  water  supplies,  [...],  the  Universities  of  Amoud, 
Hargeysa  and  Burco,  and  Edna  Adan  Maternity  Hospital,  which  are  funded 




Businesses in Somaliland contribute to social services more directly. “Companies have always 
been obliged to pay zakaat (alms), but some of the newer, larger companies are contributing to 
development projects,” further suggesting a positive role in Somaliland‟s development.
48  
 
Of course, this is not to suggest that there are not downsides to the major role of the business 
community in Somaliland. Most notably, dominant Isaaq businessmen, who provided many of 
the direct loans to the interim government in 1993, were rewarded by a monopoly over the 
regional livestock market, which has raised the ire of smaller middle-level traders.
49 Further, the 
fact that “the line between what is `public‟ and what is `private‟ is ambiguous” limits the ability 
of the government to objectively regulate the private sector.
50 Yet on the whole, the role of the 
business community in Somaliland appears to have been to its benefit. 
 
  Influence of Commercial Interests and Foreign Assistance 
 
It is impossible to say with certainty how much influence the private sector would have had if 
Somaliland  had  been  eligible  for  foreign  assistance.  What  is  clear,  however,  is  that  had 
Somaliland been eligible for financial assistance, international assistance would have dwarfed 
the financing provided by the private sector, removing the private sector‟s financial leverage.  
 
Between  1991  and  2004,  the  median  sub-Saharan  African  country  received  an  average  of 
roughly $47 USD per capita (in constant 2005 dollars). At that level, Somaliland would have 
been eligible for approximately $94 million USD based on a conservative population estimate of 
2 million. To put this in context, that amount is more triple annual Somaliland government 
revenues, which have ranged between $20  - $40 million USD between 1999 and 2009, and 
                                                 
45 Bradbury (2008), p. 103. This comes from a passage describing the Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation 
Conference in 1993, which Bradbury calls “a classic example of a peace process that addressed civil issues.” (p. 
101).  
46 War-Torn Societies Project (2005), p. 67-68. 
47 Bradbury (2008), p. 156. 
48 Bradbury (2008), p. 156. 
49 Bradbury (2008), p. 155-156. 
50 Bradbury (2008), p. 156.  
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which were even lower in preceding years.
51 (A more detailed investigation of the likely nature 
of aid policy toward an eligible Somaliland is presented in Appendix One of this paper.) 
 
This strongly suggests that had Somaliland been eligible for foreign assistance, the public sector 
would  have  been  far  less  financial  dependent  upon  commercial  interests,  and  Somaliland‟s 
political development may have followed a very different path.   
 
                                                 
51 An extended discussion of this and alternative imputations can be found in Appendix One, but in most every 
respect, this estimate is quite conservative. It uses median rather than mean aid levels, a conservative estimate of 
Somaliland‟s population, and it does not take into account the tendency for aid agencies to provide more aid per 




SECTION 3: DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
The development of Somaliland‟s political institutions also appears to have been influenced by 
its  international  isolation.  One  of  the  most  exceptional  aspects  of  Somaliland‟s  political 
institutions is the degree to which they provide real representation to all parties in the country. In 
fact,  as  of  2005,  Somaliland  is  “one  of  the  only  governments  in  Africa  with  `cohabitation‟ 
between rival parties in the executive and legislative branches.”
52  
 
One reason  given for this development is the role of traditional institutions. Somaliland has 
garnered significant attention for the central role that indigenous conflict mediation techniques 
have played in each of the many peace conferences that have occurred across the country, and 
for the fact that one of the two houses of the Somaliland legislature is built around traditional 
clan representatives. But while it is clear that these techniques facilitated conflict mediation, 
parties in the country approached the negotiating table only out of necessity after military options 
had failed. This suggests that while traditional institutions were important, their role was largely 
one of mediators, negotiating compromises forced by political necessity.
53 
 
In the two cases where necessity forced transitional governments to negotiate with opposition 
groups, Somaliland‟s eligibility for foreign assistance would likely have resulted in international 
support for the transitional governments, which would have undermined the prevailing condition 
of parity that forced political compromise. Had these compromises not been forced, Somaliland‟s 
government might not be the widely supported durable set of institutions it is today. 
 
Failure of the SNM Transitional Government 
 
Somaliland‟s efforts to establish a national government got off to an inauspicious start with the 
SNM-based transitional government established in 1991. In part due to internal divisions, and in 
part  due  to  a  lack  of  resources,  the  SNM  was  never  able  to  project  authority  beyond  the 
territories  of  the  clans  that  made  up  its  core  membership.  As  the  organization  struggled  to 
government, it became clear that the SNM had largely been held together by a common distaste 
for the military regime. With the war over, financing from the diaspora -- which had helped 
support  the  SNM  during  the  civil  war  --  dried  up,  and  the  group  succumbed  to  internal 
divisions.
54 In the words of an ICG report: 
 
[SNM transitional President  Abdirahman Ahmed Ali  `Tuur‟]  governed mainly 
from behind closed doors, and his impoverished administration exerted little real 
                                                 
52 Menkhaus (2006/2007). p. 92.  
53 Menkhaus (2001) makes a similar point, arguing that “To the extent that the role of traditional elders is to 
represent their community in peace talks, their ability to promote peace is constrained by the material interests of the 
communities to which they belong. Analysis of the motives and interests of traditional peacemakers must be rooted 
in an astute assessment of their constituencies.” (Menkhaus (2001), p. 197.) De Waal (2007) makes a related point in 
his analysis of Somalia, arguing that “the clan system in contemporary Somalia should be seen primarily as a means 
of organizing political and economic life that is driven by other interests, rather than the determining factor for 
Somalia‟s political economy.” (De Waal (2007), p. 1 of 19) 
54 Bradbury (2008), p. 85-86.  
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control, even of the capital city of Hargeysa. Within a matter of months, the SNM 
began to suffer from the kind of factionalism more often associated with southern 
Somali political movements. As tensions within the SNM came to a head, even 




Limited representation within the new SNM government quickly led to problems. Many felts that 
the administration was being dominated by the clan of the President, the Habar Yonis.
56 One 
such Isaaq clan was the Habar Jelo, a traditional rival of the president‟s clan that had held its 
peace during the civil war. This clan broke off from the SNM administration and began an 
opposition group.
57 In early 1992, government attempts to bring heavy weapons under its control 
in the town of Burco sparked heavy fighting with between the government and this opposition 
group, which left over 300 people dead.
58 But given its limited resources, the SNM was unable to 
assert its authority over this opposition group. 
 
 
(Please note that from this point forward, this analysis will use these clan two clan names despite 
the occasional involvement of additional groups in political conflicts. This simplification does 
not change the interpretation of events significantly, and helps to make this paper accessible 
without entering into an extended discussion of clan structure).
59 
 
In 1992, the SNM government attempted to take control of Somaliland‟s port of Berbera in order 
to broaden its revenue base, a move motivated in part by a desire to raise a national army
60 




At the time, however, the port of Berbera was controlled by an Isaaq clan which was not well 
represented within SNM government, the „Ilse Muse. This group “disliked the move, which they 
saw as an attempt by the [President‟s Habar Yonis clan] dominated government to appropriate 
power and the tax revenue of their port facility.”
62 This clan resisted the SNM‟s attempt to 
administer the port militarily, and was quickly joined by the Habar Jelo opposition faction.
63 The 
resulting conflict over the port lasted for five months, and caused the death of more than 600 
Somalilanders.
64  
                                                 
55 International Crisis Group (2003), p.9. 
56 Farah and Lewis (1993), p. 54-55. 
57 Farah and Lewis (1993), p. 54-55. 
58 Bradbury (2008), p. 89. 
59 At times the parties involved in conflicts are actually larger groups to which the Habar Yonis and Habar Jelo 
belong. For example, Habar Yonis is sometimes used when the Iidagale should also be included. Habar Jelo is 
occasional used when it would be more accurate to say Habar Awal, a larger group to which the Habar Jelo belong. 
This simplification does not change the interpretation of events significantly. 
60 Bradbury (2008), p. 88-89. 
61 Bradbury (2008), p. 111 
62 Farah and Lewis (1993), p. 55. 
63 Bradbury (2008), p. 89.  
64 Bradbury (2008). More than 600 is inferred from references to the combined death toll of the Burco and Berbera 
conflict being more than 1000 (p. 87) and the later statement that more than 300 were killed in the fighting in Burco 
(p. 89).  
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In an open letter released during the conflict, the „I lse Muse port stated that “Berbera is one of 
the districts of the Republic of Somaliland and is therefore subject to its rules and regulations,” 
and that “[w]e are ready to participate in a genuine national economy, national force and national 
law  and  order  structure,”  but  that  it  would  “never  accept  a  special  military  force  and  rule 
designed for Berbera alone.”
65 
 
The  conflict  eventually  drew  to  a  close  after  the  „I lse  Muse  headed  opposition  groups  had 
repulsed the SNM forces, re-secured their control over the port, and was advancing on Hargeysa, 
the SNM capital.
66 “Facing military defeat and public opposition, [the president of the SNM 
government] accepted the need to enter dialogue with the opposition,”
67 and a series of national 
peace conferences were called.  
 
  Creation of Accountable and Representative Institutions 
 
What followed was a series of three peace conferences. These conferences, which took place 
over  a  period  of  8  months  between  1992  and  1993,  were  “almost  entirely  financed  by  the 
communities of Somaliland, who thus determined the agenda.”
68 At the end of these conferences, 
what emerged was a more inclusive and representative government built around a new National 
Charter. The new government included a parliament that consisted of 150 clan elders, and a new 
president  and  vice  president.
69  Critically,  this  new  government  differed  from  the  SNM 
government in that it, 
 
“possessed a broader base in terms of political participation and representation, 
although the smaller and minority clans were  not  represented at  the  Boorame 




These conferences also resulted in the appointment of a new president, whose paternal lineage 
came from the „Ilse Muse clan -- which had controlled the port of Berbera -- and whose maternal 
lineage  came  from  the  Habar  Yonis  clan  --  which  had  previously  been  represented  by  the 
presidency. This “encouraged public optimism that [the new president] could unite the Isaaq.”
71 




The  government  created  by  the  new  National  Charter  also  divided  the  government  into  an 
presidential executive, an independent judiciary, and a bicameral legislative branch.
73 As already 
noted,  this  legislative  branch  included  one  house  made  up  of  traditional  clan  elders  who 
                                                 
65 Farah and Lewis (1993), p. 56-57. 
66 Bradbury (2008), p. 90. 
67 Bradbury (2008), p.90. 
68 Bradbury (2008), p.98. 
69 War-Torn Societies Project (2005), p. 62-63.; Farah and Lewis (1993), p. 55-58. 
70 War-Torn Societies Project (2005), p. 64. 
71 Bradbury (2008), p. 110.  
72 Bradbury (2008), p. 155. 
73 Bradbury (2008), p. 99-100.  
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represented all clans in Somaliland. This house, which was created “to guard against the re-
emergence  of  authoritarian  rule,”
74  was  given  authority  to  appoint  the  president  and  vice-
president.
75 (The presidency would later become an independently elected office). 
 
As  a  result  of  these  conferences  the  new  government  earned  “the  backing  of  some  of 
Somaliland‟s wealthiest merchants, who had interests in keeping Berbera free of conflict,”
76 and 
the  port  of  Berbera  was  placed  under  the  control  of  the  government,  which  “provided  an 
immediate revenue source for government [sic], which by September 1995 was estimated to be 
between US$10-15 million per year.”
77 
 
Second Cycle of Violence 
 
While the conferences held in Boorame in 1993 laid the foundation for all subsequent political 
institutions in the country, they did not represent the end of the development of Somaliland‟s 
political  institutions.  Unfortunately,  Somaliland  underwent  one  subsequent  cycle  of  violence 
before achieving some degree of democratic consolidation.  
 
Somaliland‟s new National Charter established a framework of accountable and representative 
institutions, but it was not embraced by all. The Habar Yonis, who had previously held central 
authority  within  the  SNM  transitional  government  broke  with  the  government  over 
disagreements  about  representation  ratios.
78  In  1996,  the  conflict  reached  a  stalemate,  but 
initially neither the government, nor opposition groups showed any willingness to compromise.  
 
What  exactly  motivated  the  government  to  reach  a  compromise  with  the  opposition  is  not 
entirely clear, but it appears to have been motivated by a combination of pressure from civil 
society and the strain the conflict was putting on the government‟s limited resources.  
 
In 1995 a group of Somalilanders living abroad organized the Peace Committee for Somaliland, 
began pushing for a peaceful resolution. This group organized a series of intra- and inter-clan 
peace conferences to promote dialogue between different groups and organize for peace.
79 The 
Committee also appears to have won the backing of Ethiopia, which encouraged rival groups to 
attend conferences out of concern Somaliland‟s conflict might spill over the border.
80  
 
The  exact  impact  of  this  organization  is  “contested,”
81  but  it  is  clear  that  the  committee 
facilitated discussion between various factions. It appears that in the view of some, however, the 
role of the Peace Committee and civil society more broadly was much greater. One analyst -- 
who founded the Peace Committee for Somaliland in 1995 and was thus intimately involved in 
deliberations at the time -- has expressed the view that: 
                                                 
74 Bradbury (2008), p. 224. 
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The war would have continued if pressure for peace and reconciliation did not 
come from civil society, first from Somalilanders living in the Diaspora, then 
from  traditional  elders,  intellectuals,  and  former  civil  servants  in  Somaliland. 
[President] „Egal and his government agreed to dialogue and negotiations when 
they could no longer contain a peace movement that grew rapidly by [1996] and 
could have swept them from power if they remained intransigent.”
82 
 
This pressure combined with the significant strain the conflict was putting on the government‟s 
limited revenue base. It is estimated that the government spent $4.5 million USD re-equipping 
the army during the conflict.
83  
 
Together, these forces were apparently sufficient to push the government towards reconciliation. 
A second series of national conference was called, this time incorporating 315 elders, more than 
double the number included in the Boorame conference. A new provisional constitution was 
adopted,  and  the  allocation  of  seats  within  the  government  was  adjusted  in  a  manner  with 
increased the representation given to the Habor Yonis, and the conflict was diffused.
84 
 
After  six  years  of  conflict  and  fighting,  the  power-sharing  arrangements  established  by  the 
Hargeysa  Conference  proved  sufficient  to  quell  further  uprisings.  From  this  point  forward, 
political conflict in Somaliland shifted to the electoral arena. In 2001 a constitutional referendum 
was  held,  and  the  provisional  constitution  created  in  Hargeysa  was  replaced  with  a  new 
constitution. This constitution was finalized in 2000 by a committee composed of individuals 
nominated by both the legislative and executive branches, was ratified in a national vote in 2001, 
and is still in place today.
85 
 
  Foreign Assistance and Forced Negotiations 
 
By  most  international  standards,  both  the  SNM  transitional  government  and  the  Boorame 
conference  were  legitimate  national  governments,  and  would  have  likely  been  eligible  for 
international assistance had Somaliland been a recognized state. They were created at a national 
conferences with the consent of clan elders from across the region, and by those agreements had 
the “right” to administer the Port of Berbera and the Hargeysa airport. Yet had the international 
community stepped in and provided support to either of these governments, it is not clear that 
either would have submitted to negotiations with the opposition. Indeed, the fact that political 
compromises followed failed attempts by the government to assert its authority by force certainly 
suggests  the  government  had  no  interest  in  engaging  in  political  negotiations  until  it  was 
necessary.  
 
It is especially noteworthy that in the first conflict, the governments efforts were motivated by a 
desire  to  control  a  port  worth  only  $7-15  million  USD  --  less  than  one  sixth  the  foreign 
assistance Somaliland would likely have received had it been eligible, even by conservative 
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estimates. This strongly suggests that had the government been receiving anything approaching 
normal levels of financial assistance, it would not have been put in a position where it was forced 
to compromise with the „I lse Muse.  
19 
SECTION 4: POLITICAL UNIFICATION AND THE PROMISE OF AID 
 
While relative parity ensured that a national government provided adequate representation to all 
parties in  the country, the willingness  of anyone in  Somaliland to support  the creation of a 
national  government  is  itself  remarkable.  From  colonial  exploitation  in  the  1800s  to  the 
tyrannical rule of the Siad Barre regime, the state has proven to be anything but a force for good 
in the experience of the average Somali. Yet Somaliland‟s government has broad public support, 
and Bradbury (2008) has argued that “[i]n many respects Somaliland is a `people‟s project‟ 
rather than a project of an elite.”
86 This achievement was made possible in part thanks to the 
decentralization of Somaliland‟s government, but also in part by the fact Somalilanders did not 
have to worry about a government with a large, independent source of resources in the form of 
foreign aid. 
 
The degree to which Somali‟s conception of the state has been shaped by historic events is best 
explained by Ken Menkhaus (2006/2007), a long time observer of Somali politics: 
 
There is perhaps no other issue on which the world-views of external actors and 
Somalis diverge more than their radically different understanding of the state. For 
external actors, the conventional wisdom is that a responsive and effective state is 
an  essential  prerequisite  for  development,  a  proposition  enshrined  in  virtually 
every World Bank and UN strategy on development. For many Somalis, the state 
is  an  instrument  of  accumulation  and  domination,  enriching  and  empowering 
those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population.
87     
 
 
This concern is common to all Somalis, but it is particularly acute among the Somalilanders, who 
suffered disproportionately under the military regime in Mogadishu. 
 
Somalilanders‟ concern about the emergence of a predatory state most clearly manifested itself 
in the push for decentralization in the design of the government. As John Drysdale, a longtime 
observer of Somali politics, noted: 
 
The  intention  of  the  authors  of  the  [1993  Transitional  National]  Charter  was 
clearly inspired by their wish to maximize the process of political devolution, 
given that the majority of Somalilanders had suffered grievously over the past two 
decades from manifold abuses of power arising out of a highly centralized state 
system of government in Muqdisho.
88 
 
A 2005 War-Torn Societies report on Somaliland similarly found during focus groups that:  
 
Many Somalilanders, particularly those beyond Hargeysa, deem decentralization 
to  be an inescapable  condition  for their participation in  Somaliland‟s political 
arrangement.
89 
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Today,  Somaliland  has  a  federal  government,  divided  into  the  central  government,  regional 
councils, and district councils. Independent elections are held at all levels, and some degree of 
fiscal decentralization is also maintained. Although customs collection was centralized in 2000, 
districts  retain  10%  of  customs  collections  that  occur  within  their  borders  and  receive  an 
additional 12.5% of pooled collections from the central government. Districts are also able to 
raise their own revenues by “taxing local resources, with land, animal slaughter and business tax 
providing  the  main  revenue  streams.”
90  Aggregate  data  on  district  government  expenditures 
suggests  that  these  measures  provide  districts  with  a  relatively  high  degree  of  fiscal 
independence  from  the  national  government,  while  also  ensuring  that  districts  maintain  a 
financial dependency on local communities.
91 
 
Even with this extensive decentralization, however, there is reason to doubt whether Somaliland 
would  have  been  able  to  overcome  skepticism  about  state  had  it  been  eligible  for  foreign 
assistance. As de Waal (2007) points out, foreign aid has long been a historic enabler of state 
predation for Somalis: 
 
Somalia was Africa‟s largest per capita recipient of international aid in Africa 
(with the exception of micro-states such as Gambia) [during the 1980‟s]. These 
huge inflows of aid money, especially from the U.S., made it possible for the Siad 
Barre government to establish a patrimonial system wholly disproportionate to the 
productive economy. Indeed, it was the aid flows that made possible the strategy 
of assaulting the productive sectors such as agriculture and livestock.
92 
 
In  other  words,  not  only  are  Somali‟s  deeply  skeptical  of  the  western  state,  but  they  also 
associate state predation with foreign assistance. With this in mind, Somaliland‟s ineligibility for 
foreign assistance was likely a major advantage for efforts to establish a national government. 
Ineligibility ensured that Somalilanders would continue to maintain a de facto mechanism of 
accountability in the form of financial dependency of a national government on tax revenues. 
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This analysis has implications both for aid-policy towards Somaliland and for broader debates on 
state-building strategies.  
 
3.1 Implications for International Policy Towards Somaliland 
 
The discussion presented in this chapter bears directly on debates over international recognition 
of Somaliland. It cannot answer whether Somaliland is deserving of international assistance, or, 
as some have argued, if recognizing Somaliland will lead to increased conflict in the rest of sub-
Saharan  Africa  (as  other  groups  are  motivated  to  secede).  What  this  analysis  does  suggest, 
however,  is  that  the  international  community  should  be  extremely  cautious  about  flooding 
Somaliland with financial assistance, as doing so might undermine the relationships of financial 
accountability that have played such a large role in Somaliland‟s success. While this paper‟s 
focus has been on Somaliland‟s early political development, recent statements by international 
observers suggest that some of the same dynamics that are explored in this paper continue to be 
important today. As a 2009 Human Rights Watch report states (after detailing some of ways 
Somaliland‟s president has not always been effectively limited by constitutional limits): 
 
Somaliland‟s  government  remains  fundamentally  a  product  of  political 
compromise, negotiation, and consensus and the presidency is often not strong 
enough to defy the diverse coalition of clan and other interests that support it. 
This reality imposes informal limits on presidential power which have worked 
well  enough  to  partially  offset  the  dysfunction  of  legal  and  constitutional 
constraints.  [...]  The  result,  as  another  analyst  put  it,  is  that  “Some  in  the 
government  don‟t  believe  in  our  democratic  process,  but  no  one  has  enough 
power to destroy it.”
93  
 
Providing the government with significant financial support could upset this balance of interests, 
potentially undermining the Somaliland‟s stability and its significant strides towards becoming a 
consolidated democracy.  
 
Given  this,  the  international  community  may  be  tempted  to  attempt  to  scale  up  directly-
administered assistance in place of direct government support, but while this may be preferable 
to direct government support, even this approach has significant political risks that should be 
considered. According to a 1999 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development report,  
 
Local NGOs mushroomed as individuals and private enterprises sought to make 
themselves eligible for sub-contracts with foreign aid organizations. Many had 
little or no experience in the fields in which they proposed to work, and their 
relationships with project `beneficiaries‟ were often ambiguous. The recognizable 
clan  affiliations  of  most  of  these  NGOs  led  to  heightened  competition  and 
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sensitivity  over  the  distribution  of  aid  resources.  Although  roughly  500  local 
NGOs are currently registered in Somaliland, only a small minority are functional 
and  possess  a  permanent  organization  structure.  The  government  views  this 
expansion of the NGO sector as a matter of concern.
94 
 
General Implications for Policy in Weak and Fragile States 
 
One important question about this review of Somaliland‟s political development is whether the 
lessons learned in Somaliland can be more broadly applied. The number of structural factors that 
contributed to Somaliland‟s success in the absence of international engagement certainly suggest 
that Somaliland may not be a generalizable case: Somaliland lacked natural resources that would 
have reduced government dependency on local revenues even in the absence of aid; it had some 
degree of parity among different clans, which prevented a single group from dominating others; 
commercial actors had an interest in promoting peace because of the nature of pastoral economic 
production;  and  the  country‟s  relatively  strong  traditional  institutions  were  able  to  mediate 
equitable agreements once resource constraints forced parties to the negotiating table.  
 
Yet there is reason to believe that Somaliland may not be as exceptional a case as it initially 
appears.  One  theme  that  underlies  Somaliland‟s  political  development  is  that  government 
dependency on local sources of revenue forces the government to take into consideration the 
interests of those outside of the government -- be they the clan in control of the port of Berbera, 
or Isaaq businessmen providing loans to the government. This dynamic, as it turns out, also 
appears to have been at the heart of the development of modern, representative governments in 
Europe.  
 
Researchers studying state formation in medieval Britain and the Netherlands have argued that 
the  modern,  representative  state  emerged  as  the  result  of  negotiations  between  autocratic 
governments who needed tax revenues in order to survive inter-state conflicts on the one hand, 
and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater government 
accountability on the other.
95 In these historic cases, government dependency on local sources of 
revenue  provided  those  in  control  of  economic  assets  with  significant  leverage  over  the 
government which they were able to use to demand the development of more accountable and 
representative  political  institutions  though  a  process  generally  referred  to  as  “revenue 
bargaining.”96 Given the similarities between these dynamics in medieval Europe and those seen 
in Somaliland‟s development, it seems reasonable to suggest that Somaliland may simply be a 
modern illustration of how government dependency on local revenue encourages accountability, 
rather than an entirely unique exception.  
 
This similarity is important because in recent years, many have voiced concerns that foreign 
assistance may be disrupting this mechanism of accountability identified in European studies. 
This is a potentially important possibility given that in 2005 there were 16 sub-Saharan countries 
in which the ratio of foreign assistance to government expenditures is greater than 50%, and in 
                                                 
94 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (1999), p. 77. 
95 Moore (2008) provides an excellent overview of literature in this area. 
96 Both Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle (2006) provide an exceptional overview of existing literature on the 
relationship between this literature as it relates to modern development policy.   
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ten of those countries, foreign assistance is equal to at least 75% of government expenditures.
97 
As an illustration of the fact that government dependency on local sources of revenue increases 
government accountability, therefore, Somaliland provides some of the most direct evidence to 
date that normal levels of foreign assistance have the potential to upset the “revenue bargaining” 
process. 
 
“Top-Down” versus “Bottom-Up” State-Building 
 
This analysis of Somaliland‟s development also has implications for the broader debate about the 
relative  merits  of  “top-down”  versus  “bottom-up”  approaches  to  state-building.  “Top-down” 
approaches, which dominate most efforts in Somalia, attempt to identify a conflict‟s dominant 
political actors in a conflict and bring them to the negotiating table. Advocates of this view argue 
it is  essential to  recognize  de facto  power relationships,  and attempt to work with  them.  In 
contrast,  “bottom-up”  strategies  focus  on  fostering  local  engagement,  either  through  locally 
selected representatives or through local political institutions. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Somaliland has become a commonly cited example in support of “bottom-up” 
development.  The  “synergy”
98  that  existed  between  local  polities  and  national  political 
reconciliation proved so successful in Somaliland, may have looked to it as a model for resolving 
other conflicts.  
 
However, this analysis suggests that advocates of “bottom-up” strategies may be overlooking an 
important dynamic that was at play in Somaliland. Local polities in Somaliland did not pursue 
constructive polities simply because they were organized at the local level. They did so at least in 
part because of the influence of the business community which actively supported these efforts. 
This distinction is important because it suggests that it is not only the level of the political entity 
that matters,  but  also  the interests and  relationships  that underly these  entities.  International 
efforts to actively finance and support local polities, which have been undertaken without success 
in  Somalia,  risk  preventing  the  types  of  relationships  that  existed  between  the  business 
community and the public sphere in Somaliland from emerging. 
 
Implications for Sequencing 
 
Finally,  Somaliland‟s  political  development  also  raises  difficult  questions  about  policy 
sequencing  in  weak  and  fragile  states.  At  first  glance,  the  fact  that  Somaliland  government 
spends approximately 80% of its budget on administrative costs and security strongly suggests 
that in the government‟s view, security is the clear priority for state-rehabilitation.
99 And as 
explored in the section of this chapter on the role of the business community, Somaliland‟s stable 
environment  has  facilitated  both  economic  development  and  relatively  sophisticated  public-
private partnerships which help to provide public goods.  
 
                                                 
97 Moss and Subramanian (2005), p. 4-6. Brautigam and Knack (2004) find similar numbers looking at data from the 
1990s. 
98 Bradbury (2008), p. 107. 
99 War-Torn Societies Project (2005), p. 67-68.  
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Yet  Somaliland  also  raises  the  troubling  idea  that  while  prioritizing  security  may  be  in  the 
interests  of  the  government,  efforts  to  promote  security  risk  cementing  the  authority  of 
unrepresentative political institutions, which may be contrary to the interests of citizens. Had the 
international  community  provided  Somaliland‟s  first  interim  government  with  the  resources 
necessary to ensure stability, the military stand-offs which motivated political reconciliation and 





Estimates of Possible Aid to Somaliland 
 
Had Somaliland been eligible for foreign assistance, the levels of assistance it would likely have 
received would have been relatively large in relation to the types of revenues currently available 
to the national government ($20-40 million USD from 1999 forward, significantly less prior to 
that). In the paper, an estimate of $94 million USD in constant 2005 terms is provided. However, 
this estimate is actually rather conservative, for three reasons. First, it is based on median rather 
than mean levels of foreign assistance. Second, it is calculated using a value of 2 million for 
Somaliland‟s population, when most estimates range from 2-3 million. 
100 And third, it does not 
take into account the well documented tendency for donors to provide higher levels of aid per 
capita to smaller countries. This appendix provides a number of alternative estimates that provide 





Population data comes from the World Development Indicators database. Aid data comes from 
the Net Aid Transfers dataset published by the Center for Global Development.
101 This data 
draws from the OECD DAC data on aid activities, but makes a few of corrections to data from 




This analysis also excludes the island country of Mayotte, which has a population of less than 
200,000 people and which receives foreign assistance in excess of $1,000 USD per capita. This 
exclusion is justified both by patchy data availability for the country, and also by the way it 
skews  estimates  of  aid  intensity  both  generally  and  in  particular  for  smaller  countries.  This 





                                                 
100 Statistics on Somaliland‟s population vary, but most estimates cluster around 2-3 million. A detailed summary of 
Somaliland population surveys can be found in a footnote in Bradbury (2008), p160. 
101 Available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492 
102 “The Net Aid Transfers (NAT) variable alters two aspects of the standard Net Overseas Development Assistance 
(Net ODA) measure that can be problematic for aid research and donor evaluation. First, where Net ODA is a capital 
flow concept, analogous to Net Foreign Direct Investment, NAT is a net transfers concept. That is, Net ODA is net 
only of principle payments received on ODA loans, not of interest received on such loans, while NAT is net of both. 
This is especially relevant for Japan, which has received more than $2 billion/year in interest on ODA loans 
recently. Second, NAT excludes cancellation of old non-ODA loans. For example, a 2003 Paris Club agreement 
cancelled some $5 billion in non-ODA official debt owed by the Democratic Republic of Congo. That cancellation 
is ODA, but since it generated little or no additional net transfers, it is not NAT. As a result, the DRC received $5.4 
billion in ODA in 2003 but only $400 million in NAT.” (Center for Global Development Net Aid Transfer Dataset 
Abstract)  
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Variable  Obs  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Country Average of 
Net Aid Transfers Per Capita 
between 1999 and 2004 
(in Constant 2005 Dollars) 
47  48.6  33.6  55.8  2.26  291.7 
Country Average of 
Net Aid Transfers Per Capita 
between 1991 and 2004 
(in Constant 2005 Dollars) 
47  64.5  46.7  69.0  2.4  358.3 
Average Population between 1991 and 2004 
(in millions)  47  11.2  6.3  16.9  0.1  97.2 
 
Correcting for Country Size 
 
Most studies of the determinants of foreign assistance finds that smaller countries receive higher 
levels of aid per capita, perhaps because of the desire of aid agencies to maintain a presence in 
all countries, including very small ones (Brautigam and Knack (2004) and Knack (2009) for 
example).  To  correct  for  this  possibility,  aid  per  capita  can  be  regressed  against  country 
populations and annual fixed effects for the sub-Saharan African region from 1990 to 2004, and 
values can then be predicted based on Somaliland‟s population both for the entire period, and for 
certain  specific  years.  These  regressions  also  include  a  dummy  for  each  country‟s  historic 
colonial relationships, as some studies have also found this to be a significant predictor of aid 
levels (Brautigam and Knack (2004), Rajan and Subramanian (2005a)).
103 
 
As in previous estimates, these results assume a population value of 2 million for Somaliland. 
While this will result in larger estimates of aid per capita than an estimate of 3 million, the 
estimates  of overall assistance remain lower with a population  estimate of 2 million  than 3 
million. Because of limited data on Somaliland, these regressions will only use the natural log of 













Net Aid Transfers Per Capita 




                                                 
103  Regressions  were  also  run  without  colonial  relationship  fixed  effects,  but  the  estimates  were  higher  for 
Somaliland, so in the interest of presenting conservative estimates, colonial fixed effects were left in place.  
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Net Aid Transfers 
per Capita 
(Annually from 
1991 – 2004) 
   
Natural Log of Population (in Millions) 
-26.788*** 
(-4.683) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with Spain 
-9.375 
(-0.579) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with France 
11.306 
(1.037) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with Great Britain 
9.681 
(0.709) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with Italy 
20.162 
(1.045) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with Belgium 
17.876 
(1.190) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with Portugal 
103.647** 
(2.412) 
Historic Colonial Relationship with South Africa  38.770*** 
(3.717) 




Observations  658 
R-squared  0.586 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Omitted Dummy is No Clear Colonizer (Liberia and Somalia, as Somalia was split 
between the Italians and British) 
Results Clustered by Country 
 
Based on these regressions, estimates of likely levels of aid per capita can be predicted for 
Somaliland. The following table provides estimates of aid per capita for various periods, and for 










Controlling for Population, Past Colonial Relationships, and Annual Fixed Effects 
Period  Net Aid Transfers Per 
Capita 
Total Aid 
For Population of 2 Million 
1991-2004 Average  $79.2  $158.4 million USD  
28 
1999-2004 Average  $66.1  $132.3 million USD 
Year of Secession (1991)  $107.2  $214.5 million USD 
Year of Boorame Conference (1993)   $98.6  $197.2 million USD 
Year of Hargeysa Conference (1997)  $75.9  $151.9 million USD 
Year Constitution Ratified (2001)  $66.7  $133.4 million USD 
All figures in Constant 2005 Dollars. Predictions based on regressions of aid per capita against the natural log of 
population and dummy variables for historical colonizer. Values of aid per capita for Somaliland were predicted on 




Empirical Evidence for  
Effectiveness of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
One  empirical  measure  of  fiscal  decentralization  is  whether  local  government  revenues  are 
correlated  with  national  revenues.  Data  from  Somaliland  suggests  that  the  success  of  fiscal 
decentralization has been mixed -- on the whole, it appears most local groups depend on the 
national  government  for  financial  support.  However,  the  revenues  of  four  municipalities  in 
Somaliland show a great deal of independence, suggesting fiscal decentralization has succeeded 
in those settings (perhaps due to greater presence of local businesses to tax than in the average 
community). This is shown in the two graphs below. The choice of municipalities included in the 
graphs  below  is  dictated  by  data  made  available  by  the  Ministry  of  National  Planning  and 
Coordination‟s Somaliland in Figures publication (this data comes from both the 2004 and 2008 
editions).
104 All expenditure data included in those reports is reproduced here.         
 
      
 
Correlation of Municipal Expenditures with Central Government Expenditures 
Municipality  Simple Correlation of Municipal and  
Central Government Expenditures 
Number of 
Years of Data 
Hargeisa  0.54  9 
Gebiley  0.43  8 
Boorame  0.72  9 
Burco  0.15  9 
Berbera  0.87  4 
All Local Expenditures Combined  0.32  9 
                                                 
104 The Somaliland in Figures version from 2004 differs from the Somaliland in Figures version for 2009 in its 
estimate of central government expenditures for 2003. This data reflects the 2009 value, which is more recent and 
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